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If the Cold War was defined by an arms race in nuclear weapons, the war on terror has featured a race to build networks of warriors.
It's a race we're losing.
Where we once watched with dread as numbers of warheads steadily rose, now it's the rapid spread of terrorist cells that imperils us.
At the height of the Soviet-American antagonism, we had to worry about ducking and covering because of threats posed by both sides'
huge arsenals. Yet living a normal life was still possible because, thanks to something called mutual assured destruction, Armageddon
was always unlikely.
But in this war, shape-shifting, ever morphing terrorist networks are striking somewhere in the world nearly every day. These
fanatical new enemies are impossible to deter, and continue to grow in numbers and ferocity despite all our costly efforts. They have
changed our world forever.
The terrorists wear many different masks and attack us in many different ways and places. They may be al Qaeda cadres sharing their
dark skills with eager volunteers across the broad swath of Muslim lands, from Morocco to Mindanao. Or they may be seemingly
respectable citizens of Western democracies who have come together secretly in response to perceived attacks upon Islam.
All can be in covert communication on the Internet. There are countless paths to jihad, and a multitude of ways to wage this new kind
of warfare.
Even after spending several hundreds of billions of dollars and suffering thousands of casualties, we have failed to keep terrorism
from metastasizing.
Indeed, the numbers of significant terrorist attacks have increased from a little more than three dozen in 2001 to more than 3,000 in
2004, according to official statistics of the National Counterterrorism Center. The much more conservative estimate of the State
Department puts last year's total above 650, still a 15-fold increase from the 2001 figure.
This is the stark reality of the intractable conflict that has come to bedevil us, this "war to change all wars."
Why has our self-styled war on terror witnessed, perhaps even sparked, an intensification of terror's war on us? Because of our
reluctance to acknowledge that the true challenge in this war is organizational.
Looking outward, we have focused on fighting nation-size opponents rather than homing in on networks.
Internally, we have failed to build our own networks, preferring instead to erect enormous, dysfunctional hierarchies like the
Department of Homeland Security and the National Intelligence Directorate.
These are both bureaucratic labyrinths where important information often languishes in remote "stovepipes." It is as though vengeful
spirits of old Soviet central planners were stalking the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, taking possession of unwary souls.
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We have conjured up our preferred vision of victory in prosaic, traditional terms, and so have allocated huge financial and human
resources to conquering and occupying territory.
All the while, al Qaeda and its affiliates have continued to evolve organizationally into an ever more dispersed and loosely linked
network, slipping most of our heavy punches and jabbing back all over the world.
During the four years since Sept. 11, 2001, the terrorists have mounted serious strikes in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Spain and Britain. And this is just a partial list.
Our invasion of Iraq, far from striking a mortal blow against al Qaeda, has actually created a hothouse environment in which terror
thrives amid a bloody insurgency.
Even the loss of their haven in Afghanistan was only a temporary inconvenience to the terrorists. It was quickly compensated for by
the establishment of a secure new base in the tribal border area of Pakistan, where we cannot go for fear of setting off an Islamist
uprising against the U.S.-friendly dictator who rules in Islamabad.
From this redoubt, al Qaeda and the Taliban are waging an insurgency against the Western-supported government in Kabul, tying
down tens of thousands of coalition forces.
While the Taliban try to replay the campaign against the Russian occupation during the 1980s -- but this time against us -- al Qaeda's
many operatives and affiliates are planning on making their next moves in a networked offensive that strikes by surprise, again and
again, around the world.
Osama bin Laden appreciated the power of networking more than a decade ago, and had the wisdom to understand that a network
emphasizes coordination, not command.
So he has held the reins of leadership loosely, especially during these past four years, giving minimal direct guidance, relying instead
on the general concept of allowing distributed cells and nodes to prosecute their own campaigns in the many theaters of this conflict,
history's first great "net war."
To the extent to which bin Laden engages directly with his far-flung affiliates, his involvement consists for the most part of
occasionally sending a few al Qaeda operatives to enliven and empower them. Sometimes by assembling bombs or showing others
how to make them. Sometimes by instructing the most covert cells in basic tradecraft -- from how to encrypt e-mails properly to
encouraging them to stay out of mosques, go clean shaven and wear T-shirts emblazoned with graven images, like Western pop
stars' faces.
Think of these al Qaeda agents as efficiency experts who occasionally visit from the headquarters of some particularly evil corporation
to whip up enthusiasm among, and impart necessary skills to, franchisees or workers in field offices.
For example, an al Qaeda activist known as Sami helped a terrorist cell in Singapore prepare for a major truck-bombing campaign
targeting American interests there.
The cell members intended to launch a wave of attacks late in 2001. But in this instance, very skillful networking between
Singaporean intelligence and law enforcement -- along with some international cooperation -- led to the successful preemption of the
attacks and the capture of nearly the whole cell.
The case doesn't stand entirely alone. We have learned from it. Although we publicly pillory the Syrians, we have networked well with
them behind the scenes. The result has been the preemption of two major attacks, one planned against the Navy's 5th Fleet
headquarters in Bahrain.
In Saharan Africa, networking with a variety of local constabularies, intelligence services and paramilitary forces led to the
destruction of two other al Qaeda-affiliated groups during the past year.
Terror networks have had to cope with a great deal of attrition among their fighters during the past four years, but these losses have
been more than compensated for by new recruits.
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While these fresh forces are less skilled than those who came before, al Qaeda leaders found a good tactic for employing them: suicide
bombing. Just as Japan made up for the loss of experienced pilots by developing kamikazes during World War II, al Qaeda has found
suicide squads an optimal way to make use of the growing numbers of raw recruits who are flocking to the cause.
Thus, al Qaeda has adjusted to deal with our more successful attacks on it, while the gains we have occasionally made have been
outweighed by our largely wasted conventional military efforts in Iraq. The huge rise in terrorism since 2001 is indicative of this.
Keeping 17 brigades in Iraq has made it well-nigh impossible for us to sustain a high-tempo offensive against terror networks
elsewhere around the world.
As this first war between nations and networks enters its fifth year, it seems clear that Iraq has become pivotal. Not because it is a
"central front" in the war on terror, as President Bush maintains. Rather, Iraq matters so much precisely because it has so little to do
with the fight against al Qaeda, yet consumes enormous material and human resources.
If we refuse to see this and remain focused on fighting there for nation-building purposes, we will never defeat the networks that pose
the real threat to future peace and prosperity in the world.
If, on the other hand, we lace up our shoes and get back into the organizational race by focusing on building our own networks, we
can still win this war.
This will mean transforming our military from one of heavy divisions, battle groups and brigades to one of small, supple detachments.
It will mean sharing very sensitive information with allies around the world. It will even mean cultivating deep ties with criminal and
insurgent elements willing to help us track down the terrorists.
Four years of floundering is enough. Let's make the fresh start that is needed. Now.
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